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INTRODUCTION
The American way of waging war has changed significantly in the
past two decades. Following the Cold War, the military began to use
private military firms, or PMFs, to support and supplant many of its
functions. 1 The U.S. military’s 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq
was accompanied by another army, one of contractors, who would
help stabilize and rebuild the country. 2 At their highest numbers, there
were approximately 150,000 contractors in the Iraqi warzone, and
approximately 30,000 of those were authorized to carry weapons and
performed many quasi-military functions. 3 The only distinction
between them and their army counterparts was their placement outside
of the chain-of-command. While they were nominally within the
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2012, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology. The author wishes to thank Xiomara Angulo and Matthew Savin for
their assistance and advice on this topic.
1
Laura A. Dickinson, Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and
the Problem of Accountability Under International Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV.
135, 149 (2005).
2
Jonathan Finer, Recent Developments, Holstering the Hired Guns: New
Accountability Measures for Private Security Contractors, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 259,
260 (2008).
3
Id.
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chain-of-command because of the contracts they operated under, an
individual contractor did not have to follow orders from a military
official. 4
The recently vacated Seventh Circuit case of Vance v. Rumsfeld
arises from this setting. 5 In that case, two American citizens working
for an Iraqi PMF were detained by the U.S. military and subjected to
sleep deprivation and repeated interrogations. 6 They had reported on
the illegal activities of the PMF which they worked for and were
detained to determine if they were a “security threat.” After being
released and returning to the United States, they filed suit against
Donald Rumsfeld and other military officials, alleging that their
Eighth Amendment constitutional rights had been violated and that
they were entitled to a remedy of damages under Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents. 7 Although Bivens remedies have been
allowed for violation of a citizen’s Eighth Amendment rights while on
U.S. soil 8 , no court had been presented with the question of whether
U.S. citizens are entitled to a Bivens remedy when their Eighth
Amendment rights are violated in a warzone. 9
This Comment will argue that the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in
Vance failed to adequately address “special factors” that should
preclude a Bivens remedy for security contractors working for Private
Military Firms (PMFs). It will do so by examining the rise of PMFs;
what laws they operate under; and how they were used in Iraq
following Operation Iraqi Freedom. It will then chart the Supreme
Court’s creation of implied rights of action under Bivens and their
application to the military. It summarizes and analyzes the portion of
the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Vance, which dealt with the Bivens
4

Dickinson, supra note 1, at 199–200.
Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591, reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated,
Nos. 10-1687, 10-2442 (7th Cir. Oct. 28, 2011).
6
Id. at 594.
7
Id.; Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971).
8
Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007).
9
Other Federal Circuits have held that noncitizens are not entitled to a Bivens
remedy for a violation of Eighth Amendment rights. See, e.g., Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649
F.3d 762, (D.C. Cir. 2011); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009).
5
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special factors analysis and proposes alternative grounds for why the
Seventh Circuit should have stayed its hand in creating a Bivens
remedy.
I. THE RISE OF PRIVATE MILITARY FIRMS AND THEIR USE IN IRAQ
A. The Rise of Private Military Firms
Between the first and second Gulf Wars 10 , the U.S. military’s use
of private contractors has significantly increased. This is largely due to
the Department of Defense determination that “[o]nly those functions
that must be performed by DoD should be kept by DoD.” 11 The
Department of Defense divides its functions into three separate
categories: those directly linked to warfighting; those indirectly linked
to warfighting; and those not linked to warfighting. 12 The Department
of Defense is willing to share all functions with the private sector.
However, it has determined to aggressively privatize and outsource the
second two categories. 13 The Department of Defense’s determination
to privatize and outsource entire functions led to the ratio of
contractors to troops to be approximately one to one hundred in the
first Gulf War 14 and one to ten in the second Gulf War. 15 This led The
Economist to dub the second Gulf War “the first privatised [sic]
war.” 16

10

Officially known as The Persian Gulf War (August 2, 1990 – February 28,
1991) and the Iraq War (March 20, 2003 – December 31, 2011).
11
Department of Defense, 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Sept. 30,
2001, at 61, available at http://www.dod.gov/pubs/qdr2001.pdf.
12
Id. at 61–62.
13
Id.
14
George Cahlink, Army of Contractors, GOV’T EXECUTIVE, Feb. 1, 2002, at
43, available at http://www.govexec.com/features/0202/0202s5.htm
15
Peter W. Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military
Firms and International Law, 42 COLUM J. TRANSNAT’L L. 521, 523 (2004).
16
Military Industrial Complexities, ECONOMIST, Mar. 29, 2003, at 56.
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B. The Laws Under Which Private Military Firms Operate
PMFs operate in the areas between the laws of their home nation,
the nation where they are operating, and the international sphere. 17 For
American citizens working for PMFs, this includes: contract law, the
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (“MEJA”), and the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”). 18 For the purposes of this
Comment, only the UCMJ will be examined. In Iraq, contractors fell
into a “legal loophole” that placed them outside the typical “gray area”
in which they operate, so Congress enacted the John Warner National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, which amended
10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10). 19 The amendment expanded the UCMJ to
cover civilians “accompanying the force” during “contingency
operation[s].” 20 Although the Supreme Court case of Reid v. Covert, 21
held that subjecting civilian spouses to UCMJ jurisdiction was
unconstitutional, a careful and in-depth analysis of the amendment
concluded that courts would find it constitutional. 22 All American
citizens working for a PMF in Iraq are therefore subject to the
UCMJ. 23
C. The Use Of Private Military Firms In Iraq
Contractors supporting the military in Iraq can be placed into one
of three groups: those that provide support; those that provide
17

Cara-Ann M. Hamaguchi, Recent Developments, Between War and Peace:
Exploring the Constitutionality of Subjecting Private Civilian Contractors to the
Uniform Code of Military Justice During “Contingency Operations,” 86 N.C. L.
REV. 1047, 1048 (2008).
18
See generally Charles Tiefer, No More Nisour Squares: Legal Control of
Private Security Contractors in Iraq and After, 88 OR. L. REV. 745 (2009).
19
Hamaguchi, supra note 17, at 1048–50.
20
10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 552, 120
Stat. 2083, 2217 (2007).
21
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957).
22
Hamaguchi, supra note 17, at 1064–66.
23
Id. at 1050.
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consulting; and the “military provider firms” that are authorized to
carry arms and perform quasi-military roles. 24 At their highest levels,
there were approximately 30,000 armed security contractors who
protected convoys, state officials and diplomats, Army Corps of
Engineers units, and military compounds. 25 Therefore, they performed
almost all normal duties of a military combat unit while being outside
the military chain-of-command. While the PMF employing the
contractors may have been limited because of contract law principles,
the contractors themselves did not have to follow orders from a
military official. 26
II – IMPLIED RIGHTS OF ACTION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
A. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, the United States
Supreme Court held that an individual is entitled to a private cause of
action when federal officials violate a constitutional right, even if no
statute explicitly created such a cause of action. 27 The Bivens Court
noted that “where federally protected rights have been invaded, it has
been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their
remedies so as to grant necessary relief.” 28 Having determined that
courts could create a remedy in such circumstances, it stated that,
“damages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion
of personal interests in liberty.” 29 The Bivens Court therefore allowed
the suit against the federal agents to proceed under the theory that the
cause of action could be implied from the face of the Fourth
Amendment. 30 The Bivens Court did not address whether “special
24

Tiefer, supra note 18, at 753.
Finer, supra note 2, at 260.
26
See Tiefer, supra note 18, at 761.
27
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971)
28
Id. at 392 (Internal citation omitted).
29
Id. at 395.
30
Id. at 397.
25
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factors” or an alternative remedy required restraint in the absence of
Congressional action on the issue. 31 As such, it reserved answering
those questions for later cases.32
1. Bush v. Lucas
In Bush v. Lucas, the United States Supreme Court held that a
Bivens remedy does not exist when an alternative process will protect
a constitutional liberty interest. 33 The Bush Court grappled with the
question of whether civil service employees could bring an action for
damages when the employees’ rights were violated by their
superiors. 34 The Bush Court noted that “[t]he question is not what
remedy the court should provide for a wrong that would otherwise go
unredressed” because civil service employees were already entitled to
a comprehensive set of remedies. 35 Instead, the main issue before the
court was “whether an elaborate remedial system . . . should be
augmented by the creation of a new judicial remedy for the
constitutional violation at issue.” 36 Because the issue before it
implicated a complex, existing regulatory structure, the Bush Court
held that Congress was in a “far better position than a court” to
determine whether a “new species of litigation” should be permitted. 37
Although the Bush Court couched its decision in terms of whether
“special factors” preclude creation of a new remedy, the holding in
Bush was interpreted in subsequent Supreme Court cases to mean that
when an alternative, existing process for protecting a liberty interest

31

Id. at 396.
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983);
Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007). These cases will be discussed further infra.
33
Bush, 462 U.S. at 390.
34
Id. at 368.
35
Id. at 388.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 389.
32
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exists, courts should refrain from providing a new remedy in
damages. 38
2. Wilkie v. Robbins
In Wilkie v. Robbins, the United States Supreme Court held that
certain “special factors” can preclude the creation of a remedy in
damages for a federal official’s violation of a constitutionally
protected liberty interest. 39 The Wilkie Court considered whether a
Bivens remedy should be allowed in a case where federal officials
violated a landowner’s property rights. 40 In Wilkie, the Court found
that “the forums of defense and redress . . . are a patchwork;” and that
“[i]t would be hard to infer that Congress expected the judiciary to
stay its Bivens hand, but equally hard to extract any clear lesson that
Bivens” supported creation of a new claim. 41 Because no adequate
alternative remedy existed in this case, the Court moved to the second
step of the Bivens test and examined whether any “special factors”
precluded a new remedy in damages. 42 The government’s argument
that it was difficult to define limits “to legitimate zeal on the public’s
behalf” ultimately won the Court over. 43 The Wilkie Court reasoned
that when government employees “push too hard for the Government’s
benefit,” Congress was the best institution to provide a remedy
because it could “tailor any remedy to the problem perceived, thus
lessening the risk of raising a tide of suits threatening legitimate
initiative on the part of the Government’s employees.” 44 Justice
Thomas wrote a concurrence, which Justice Scalia joined, that
reiterated their position that “Bivens is a relic of the heady days in
which this Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of

38

Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550.
Id. at 562
40
Id. at 549.
41
Id. at 554.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 562.
39
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action,” and that “Bivens and its progeny should be limited ‘to the
precise circumstances that they involved.’” 45
3. Carlson v. Green
In Carlson v. Green, the United States Supreme Court held that a
Bivens remedy for damages was available under the Eighth
Amendment. 46 In Carlson, an executrix brought a claim against
federal prison officials for causing her son’s death. 47 The executrix
pleaded a violation of the Eight Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment under Bivens. 48 Because this was the first Bivens
action brought under the Eight Amendment, the Supreme Court
analyzed whether any special factors counseled hesitation or if an
alternative remedy existed for this type of constitutional violation. 49
The Supreme Court found that no special factors existed and even if
allowing a Bivens action to proceed against prison officials, qualified
immunity would ensure that they were not “inhibit[ed]” in performing
their function. 50 Next, the Supreme Court examined whether the
Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) provided a sufficient alternative
remedy. 51 It concluded that the FTCA was not an alternative remedy
because the congressional comments for the FTCA amendment
indicated that Congress felt that Bivens and the FTCA were “parallel,
complementary causes of action.” 52 Because the two remedies were
not meant to be mutually exclusive, and because Bivens remedies can
be more effective when government officials violate a constitutionallyprotected liberty interests, the Supreme Court concluded that a Bivens
45

Id. at 568 (citing Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75
(2001)) (Thomas, J., concurring).
46
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 23 (1980).
47
Id. at 16.
48
Id. at 17.
49
Id. at 18–19.
50
Id. at 19.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 19–20.
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remedy should exist when government officials violate an individual’s
Eighth Amendment rights. 53
4. United States v. Stanley
In United States v. Stanley, the United States Supreme Court held
that a Bivens remedy is not available for injuries arising out of or in
the course of military service activity. 54 In Stanley, a serviceman was
secretly given lysergic acid diethylamide (“LSD”) because the military
wanted to understand its effects on humans. 55 After being
administered the drug, he underwent drastic personality changes that
caused his discharge from the military and the dissolution of his
marriage. 56 After he learned that he was secretly administered the
drug, he brought a claim against various military officials under the
FTCA and Bivens. 57 Although the Supreme Court had previously
decided under Chappell v. Wallace 58 that enlisted personnel cannot
bring a Bivens claim against superior officers, it had not decided
whether all Bivens claims brought by military personnel are barred.59
The Supreme Court held that military personnel cannot bring Bivens
claims for injuries “that ‘arise out of or are in the course of activity
incident to service.’” 60 It reached this holding by reasoning that
because claims brought by military personnel under the FTCA are
barred when they arise out of or are incident to service, any claims
under Bivens must likewise be precluded. 61

53

Id. at 20–23.
United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 684 (1987).
55
Id. at 671.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 672.
58
Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
59
Stanley, 483 U.S. at 676.
60
Id. at 684 (citing Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
61
Stanley, 483 U.S. at 684.
54
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III . VANCE V. RUMSFELD
A. Factual Background
Vance v. Rumsfeld arose from the alleged torture of two American
citizens working for a PMF in Iraq. 62 Donald Vance and Nathan Ertel
traveled to Iraq in 2005 to work for the PMF, Shield Group Security
(“SGS”). 63 While performing their duties for SGS, they witnessed
several actions that they believed to be illegal by SGS employees. 64
During a visit to Chicago, Vance contacted the FBI and reported what
he had observed. 65 He was assigned an FBI contact who requested that
Vance continue to report on the suspicious activities of SGS
employees. 66 Vance did so and was put in contact with a U.S. official
in Iraq. 67 The official requested copies of certain documents on SGS’s
computers, which Vance provided. 68 SGS became suspicious of Vance
and Ertel’s actions and on April 14, 2006, armed SGS employees
confiscated the men’s access cards. 69 Being effectively trapped in the
“Red Zone,” 70 Vance and Ertel contacted two U.S. officials to be
rescued. 71 They barricaded themselves in a room within the SGS
compound and were eventually rescued by U.S. forces. 72

62

Vance v. Rumsfeld (“Vance I”), 694 F. Supp. 2d 957, 959 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
The “Red Zone” refers to designated unsafe areas in Iraq. In Bagdad, there is
a small “Green Zone” which houses a high security Multi-National Force-1 (“MNF1”) Compound. All parts of Baghdad outside of this compound are considered part
of the “Red Zone.”
71
Id.
72
Id.
63
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Following their rescue, they were taken to the U.S. Embassy and
had all of their belongings seized. 73 At the Embassy they were
questioned by an FBI agent and U.S. Air Force Intelligence
personnel. 74 During the questioning, both men told the officials about
their government contacts in the United States and Iraq. 75 Following
their interviews, they were allowed to sleep for a few hours and were
awakened suddenly by armed guards who arrested them and took them
to Camp Prosperity. 76 Their arrest and detention was a result of being
labeled as “security internees” affiliated with SGS. 77
Two days later they were transferred to Camp Cropper and
subjected to repeated interrogation by military personnel. 78 After
several days at Camp Cropper, they were taken before a Detainee
Status Board on April 26, 2006, to determine their legal status. 79 On
May 17, 2006, Major General John Gardner authorized Ertel’s
release. 80 On July 20, 2006, Vance was permitted to leave Camp
Cropper several days after Major General Gardner authorized his
release. 81 Following their release, the men brought a Bivens claim
against the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld.

73

Id.
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 960.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
The opinion only states that the Detainee Status Board officially
acknowledged that Ertel was an innocent civilian, there is nothing on the Board’s
findings on Vance. Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
74
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B. District Court’s Decision
1. Alternative Remedies Analysis 82
Judge Wayne Andersen, writing for the District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, analyzed whether Rumsfeld’s motion to
dismiss Vance and Ertel’s claims should be granted. 83 Judge
Andersen’s opinion gave only cursory treatment to whether alternative
remedies were available to the men. 84 This was largely due to
Rumsfeld’s concession “that the [Detainee Treatment Act (“DTA”)]
does not apply to the facts of th[e] case and does not provide a remedy
to vindicate . . . constitutional rights.” 85 Judge Andersen relied on the
Supreme Court’s language in Davis v. Passman to conclude that the
absence of an alternative remedy strongly supports the creation of a
Bivens remedy because constitutional rights can become “precatory”
without an enforcement mechanism. 86 Having concluded that there
was no alternative remedy and that there was “strong support” for
creating a remedy, he moved onto the special factors analysis. 87
2. “Special Factors” Analysis
Judge Andersen began his analysis of whether special factors
precluded the creation of a Bivens remedy by rejecting Rumsfeld’s
argument that a remedy should not be extended in this case because
they have become “generally disfavored” by the courts. 88 He reasoned
that although the Supreme Court has been unwilling to create many
82

This Comment will only address the District Court and Seventh Circuit’s
Bivens analysis, so the other aspects of those opinions will not be summarized or
analyzed.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 972.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
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new remedies under Bivens, this move “[did] not remove the
availability of a Bivens remedy to federal courts tasked with
adjudicating distinct constitutional violations.” 89
Judge Andersen then addressed the three special factors that
Rumsfeld argued should preclude the creation of a Bivens remedy. 90
These factors included: separation of powers; misuse of the courts as a
weapon to interfere with the war effort; and other serious adverse
consequences for national defense. 91 Judge Andersen reasoned that
Vance and Ertel’s claims did not require significant oversight or
military governance. 92 He agreed that courts should still defer to the
military because judges do not have the experience or expertise to
control the military. 93 Because the court was merely being asked
whether it could provide a remedy for harms that had already occurred
during a period of war, Judge Andersen concluded that allowing a
Bivens remedy would not “infringe ‘on the core role of the
military.’” 94
Another factor that Judge Andersen found important was that the
plaintiffs were both American citizens at the time of their detention
and alleged torture. 95 These two points were of importance because
the case that Rumsfeld primarily relied upon, In re Iraq and
Afghanistan Detainees Litigation, did not create a Bivens remedy
because of the litigants’ status as non-citizens. 96 That case also
addressed the importance of isolating the military official from claims
that “call him to account in his own civil courts and divert his efforts .
. . from the military offensive abroad.” 97 Although Judge Andersen did
89

Id. at 973.
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 973–74.
93
Id. at 973.
94
Id. at 974 (citing Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1027–28).
95
Vance I, 694 F. Supp. 2d at 973–74.
96
Id. at 974.
97
Id. (citing In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litigation, 479 F. Supp. 2d
85, 105 (2007)).
90
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agree that claimants such as those in the In re Iraq litigation should
generally not have access to the courts, he determined that highranking officials should not have a “blank check” in using their war
powers to violate the constitutional liberties of American citizens. 98
C. Seventh Circuit’s Decision
1. Majority’s Alternative Remedies Analysis
Judge Hamilton, writing for the majority, agreed with Judge
Andersen in the District Court that there was no alternative remedy
available to Vance and Ertel. 99 Although Rumsfeld conceded that there
was no alternative remedy in the District Court, the issue was raised in
an amicus brief filed by former Department of Defense officials. 100
They argued that Vance and Ertel were not entitled to a remedy under
Bivens because the plaintiffs could have taken advantage of the
Geneva Conventions, the Coalition of Provisional Authority
Memorandum # 3, or the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 101 The
amici argued that Vance and Ertel had an alternative remedy because
those laws provided them with an avenue to complain about their
treatment. 102
Judge Hamilton rejected the amici’s argument for three
reasons. 103 First, he reasoned that the alternative remedy would be
insufficient because of the nature of the plaintiffs’ claims—that those
at the top of the chain of command were responsible for the violation
of their constitutional rights. 104 Second, he reasoned that the ability to
complain would at best stop the violation, but it would not provide any

98

Vance 1, 694 F. Supp. 2d at 974.
Vance v. Rumsfeld (“Vance II”), 653 F.3d 591, 614 (2011).
100
Id. at 613.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 613–14.
99
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sanctions against the officials who caused the violation. 105 Finally, he
concluded that the remedy was illusory at best because Vance and
Ertel had complained, but the Camp Cropper commander informed
them “there was nothing he could do about their treatment.” 106 Judge
Hamilton also compared the remedy raised by the amici to the two
remedies the Supreme Court found sufficient in Schwiker and Bush. 107
He found that both of those cases involved “elaborate and
comprehensive” remedies providing “meaningful safeguards” and that
there was no similar system for American citizens who claimed they
were tortured in a war zone by government officials. 108 Having
concluded that there was no remedy available to Vance and Ertel,
Judge Hamilton proceeded to the second step of the Bivens analysis.
2. Majority’s “Special Factors” Analysis
Judge Hamilton began the special factors analysis by noting that
Vance and Ertel were asserting a relatively narrow claim whereas
Rumsfeld was arguing for the immunity of every military official in a
war zone. 109 He found great importance in the fact that Vance and
Ertel’s claim did not challenge military policy; it merely requested a
remedy in damages for the violation that had already occurred. 110
After his initial comparison between the scope and nature of the claim
and defense, he analyzed the precedent supporting Vance and Ertel’s
claim. 111 First, he noted that it is “well established” that prisoners can
seek a remedy in damages under Bivens if they have their rights
violated by government officials. 112 Next, he noted that it is also “well
established” that American citizens can seek a remedy in damages
105

Id. at 614.
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 615.
112
Id. at 615–16.
106
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under Bivens if their rights are violated by military personnel. 113 He
also found that the Constitution’s restrictions apply in any location
where government officials act and that their powers are not “absolute
and unlimited” merely because they act outside of U.S. borders. 114
Finally, he concluded that a claim could proceed against Rumsfeld
because although Cabinet members and other high-ranking officials in
the Executive Branch are entitled to qualified immunity, they do not
have absolute immunity from constitutional claims. 115
After considering the precedent supporting Vance and Ertel’s
claim, Judge Hamilton addressed the two special factors raised by
Rumsfeld: First, that the courts should refrain from interfering in
military affairs and matters of national security; and second, that
congressional action indicates that detainees should not be afforded a
remedy under Bivens. 116 Because Vance and Ertel were merely
challenging the violation of their rights and were not mounting a broad
challenge to military policy, Judge Hamilton found that the first
special factor was not a reason to preclude a Bivens remedy. 117 He
concluded that the judiciary would not interfere with military decisionmaking by allowing a Bivens remedy here because any claims like
those of Vance and Ertel would be heard “well after the fact” and that
they were “grave” and “rare.” 118 He reasoned that although litigation
concerning matters of national security and military policy necessarily
implicates classified and other sensitive information, “judicial
intrusion into matters of national security” does not exist where the
law provides various privileges to protect state secrets. 119 Judge
Hamilton buttressed his conclusion that the adjudication of such
claims does not threaten separation of powers through Boumediene v.

113
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Bush and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. 120 Because the Supreme Court found
that the three branches of government should play “complementary
roles” in the realm of national security, he concluded that it was
appropriate for the judiciary to involve itself in matters of national
security in order to safeguard Constitutional rights like the ones at
issue in Vance. 121 The final point Judge Hamilton addressed under the
first special factor was the distinction between citizens and noncitizens. 122 Judge Hamilton distinguished the nature of the claim in
Vance from the cases raised by Rumsfeld where other Federal Circuit
courts denied a Bivens remedy to non-citizens. 123 The concern about
non-citizens using the courts to interfere in matters of national security
was the driving reason why the other Circuits denied a Bivens remedy
in those cases, and Judge Hamilton found that they were sufficiently
different from the claim in Vance because of the “grave breach of our
most basic social compact.” 124 Because allowing a Bivens remedy
would at worst cause slight interference in military affairs and national
security, Judge Hamilton determined that this special factor should not
bar Vance and Ertel’s claim. 125
The next special factor that Judge Hamilton addressed was
whether congressional action indicated that it did not intend to afford
detainees a remedy under Bivens. 126 Rumsfeld argued that
120

Vance II, 653 F.3d at 619; Boumediene v. Bush, 552 U.S. 723 (2008)
(holding that enemy combatants held in Guantanamo are entitled to habeas corpus
review and that the Military Commissions Act of 2006 was an unconstitutional
suspension of the right to habeas corpus); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)
(O’Connor, J., plurality) (holding that Congress authorized the detention of enemy
combatants but that due process required that combatants have a meaningful
opportunity to challenge their status and that the government must provide notice of
the charges and an opportunity for the combatant to be heard, although the normal
procedural protections of a trial need not be imposed on the government)
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congressional intent on the issue precluded creation of a remedy
because Congress did not create a private cause of action in various
statutes controlling the treatment of detainees. 127 Judge Hamilton
rejected that argument and cited numerous statutes which authorized
and regulated private causes of action against government officials
accused of torturing non-citizens. 128 He determined that accepting
Rumsfeld’s argument would create an “anomalous result” because it
would allow Rumsfeld to be sued in a foreign country for torturing an
American citizen, if that country prohibited torture, but not in the
United States. 129 Judge Hamilton reasoned that the Torture Victim
Protection Act, upon which Vance and Ertel relied, showed that
Congress “[s]urely . . . would rather have such claims against U.S.
officials heard in U.S. courts,” and that it was appropriate to allow a
Bivens remedy in Vance. 130
3. Dissent’s “Special Factors” Analysis
Judge Manion, writing in dissent, provided five reasons why he
disagreed with the majority on whether a Bivens remedy should be
created in this case. 131 He began by noting that it was
“understandable” why the majority thought there “must be a remedy”
in the present case. 132 He was not unsympathetic toward Vance and
Ertel’s claim, and he agreed that the allegations, if true, had significant
constitutional implications. 133 His disagreement centered on whether
the Seventh Circuit should extend a remedy in the face of the Supreme
Court’s warning that Congress is the appropriate body to create new
remedies. 134 He noted that the other circuits which were presented
127

Id.
Id.
129
Id. at 623.
130
Id. at 624.
131
Id. at 629.
132
Id. at 628.
133
Id.
134
Id.
128

18
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol7/iss1/2

18

Auchter: Big Boy Rules, or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love "Specia

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 7, Issue 1

Fall 2011

with the question of whether a Bivens remedy should be created for
allegations of constitutional violations had answered in the
negative. 135 Because of the consensus amongst the circuits which had
addressed the question, he concluded that it was Congress’s role to
create any remedy. 136
Judge Manion determined that the special factors analysis was
more “straightforward” than what the majority made it out to be
because of the agreement in the two circuits which had addressed the
question. 137 He reasoned that it was a “commonsense understanding”
for courts to exhibit restraint when interfering in military and national
security affairs and that the Seventh Circuit went against that
understanding by creating a remedy in the face of lacking Supreme
Court precedent on the matter. 138
Judge Manion next turned to the precedent that the majority cited
and noted that the special factors present in the cases they relied upon
did not include the “legitimate special factors of national security and
military policy.” 139 He determined that the precedent relied upon by
the majority only dealt with whether a Bivens remedy could be
brought for violations that occurred within the United States. 140
Because of the nature of actions taken by a governmental official in a
war zone, he concluded that Congress, and not the courts, was the
appropriate arbiter to establish the “‘who,’ ‘what,’ ‘when,’ ‘where,’
‘why,’ and ‘how much’” of a private right of action. 141
Judge Manion then concluded that the difficulties inherent in
judicial review of military action were significantly greater than those
stated by the majority. 142 The majority relied upon the state secret
privilege to conclude that any confidential matters would be protected
135
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but Judge Manion determined that the privilege required “significant
judicial intrusion” into military and national security policy. 143 Again,
he reasoned that Congress was best placed to balance such concerns,
especially because of the way in which the existence of a civil remedy
could affect the split-second decisions required on a battlefield. 144
Next, he concluded that the majority was incorrect in
distinguishing from the cases in other circuits on the sole fact that
Vance and Ertel were American citizens. 145 He reasoned that their
status was a minor factor compared to the three special factors relied
upon by the other circuits: “national security interests, confidential
information, and the risks posed by proceedings in open court.”146
Because the decisions in those courts were based on similar special
factors present in Vance, Judge Manion determined that Vance and
Ertel’s status as American citizens was not in itself sufficient to depart
from the other circuits’ decisions and establish a Bivens remedy. 147
Judge Manion’s fourth reason for disagreement was the majority’s
reliance on Supreme Court habeas corpus cases that provided limited
judicial oversight of military decision making. 148 He again reiterated
his point that the Supreme Court cautioned judicial intervention when
there are special factors. 149 He determined that the special factors
present in Vance were sufficient to counsel hesitation and required
Congress to decide the question of whether a remedy should be
created. 150
Judge Manion’s final point cautioned against the far reaching
nature of the majority’s decision. 151 He noted that there was an
“enormous number” of contractors working for PMFs and that the
143
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creation of a Bivens remedy for these individuals would open a
“Pandora’s Box” of claims. 152 Because of the differences between
military detention and domestic prisons, Judge Manion foresaw
“potentially thousands” of claims arising from the detention of
American civilians working for PMFs in a war zone. 153 He therefore
determined that it was inappropriate for the court to extend a Bivens
remedy without any guidance from Congress. 154
IV – ANALYSIS: PLAYING BY BIG BOY RULES
A. Opening Pandora’s Box: Vance’s Potential Impact on the Way
America Conducts Foreign Policy
This comment agrees with Judge Manion that Vance opens a
“Pandora’s Box” of potential claims. 155 At their highest levels in the
Iraq War, there were approximately 150,000 contractors working for
PMFs. 156 That number almost matches the highest level of troops –
166,300 in October 2007. 157 Judge Manion was correct in pointing out
that the drastic difference between military detention and domestic
prisons would be the basis for numerous claims, even if many
contractors are former military personnel. 158 Although the contractors
themselves may ultimately be innocent or even cooperating with the
U.S. government, they should still be detained if they are connected
with a PMF which is suspected of illegal activity or supporting enemy
combatants. Judge Hamilton concluded that the narrow nature of
Vance and Ertel’s claim did not mount a broad challenge to military
152
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policy, but his conclusion failed to consider the impact that the
availability of such a claim would have on military policy. 159 The
American way of waging war has changed, and military officials now
need to consider how and where to use PMFs. The availability of a
Bivens claim for American citizens working as contractors is a
distraction that will hinder the effectiveness of the U.S. military. Under
the Majority’s opinion, American military officials must now also
consider whether they will violate citizen contractor’s constitutional
rights when making the split second decisions required in war. 160
Vance could become the basis for any future claims brought by citizen
contractors, and those claims would have an undeniable impact on
implementation and effectiveness of military policy. 161
B. The Seventh Circuit’s “Special Factors” Dispute
The majority and dissent’s disagreement over whether special
factors barred Vance and Ertel’s claim seems to rest on which branch
of the government should create a remedy for citizens detained and
tortured in a warzone. 162 The majority concluded that the courts were
the appropriate forum because there were no special factors counseling
restraint. The dissent, on the other hand, concluded that Congress was
the appropriate forum because establish the “‘who,’ ‘what,’ ‘when,’
‘where,’ ‘why,’ and ‘how much’” of a private right of action. 163 This
comment agrees that the dissent was correct in concluding that the
special factors analysis was straightforward and that Congress is best
placed to balance the concerns of protecting constitutional rights
against national security and military policy. Although a further special
factor will be addressed in the next section, the special factors raised
by the majority and dissent lead to the conclusion that the court should
have stayed its hand in Vance. Although the courts do have a place in
159
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matters of national security, especially when Constitutional rights are
at stake, the Supreme Court has consistently cautioned against
extending Bivens remedies into any new context. 164 The majority
ignored this caution, and the consensus of the other circuits who had
already addressed the question of whether a Bivens remedy was
available for the violation of constitutional rights in a warzone, when it
extended a Bivens remedy in Vance.
C. Big Boy Rules:
The Problem with Focusing on Vance and Ertel’s Status as Citizens
The majority’s argument in Vance places great weight on Vance
and Ertel’s status as citizens and concludes that their claim should be
allowed to proceed as a result. 165 Other circuits had already addressed
whether Bivens claims should be allowed when non-citizens’ rights
were violated in Iraq, so the majority needed to distinguish from those
cases. 166 The majority misrepresented the facts in Vance, however,
when it concluded that Vance and Ertel were merely citizens. Under
the law, they were civilians “accompanying the force” during
“contingency operation[s]” in Iraq. 167 As such, they were subject to
the UCMJ 168 and their status was more analogous to a member of the
military. Because they are similarly situated to a member of the armed
forces, they should either be classified as quasi-military personnel or
be considered military personnel when bringing a Bivens claim. The
Supreme Court has already established a special factor to consider
when a Bivens claim is brought by a member of the armed forces, 169
and that factor should apply to quasi-military personnel because many
164

See, e.g., Corr. Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001).
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jurisdiction when accompanying the force in a contingency operation.
169
See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 684 (1987).
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of the same concerns which prompted the creation of that factor apply
to quasi-military personnel. There is significant legislative control 170
over the “rights, duties, and responsibilities” 171 of PMFs and that
control is the basis for either applying the Stanley special factor to
quasi-military personnel or creating a new special factor for quasimilitary personnel. Applying this factor would bar any Bivens claims
which “‘arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to [quasimilitary] service.’” 172 If this special factor were applied to Vance and
Ertel’s claim, it would be barred under Bivens because the
injury—their detention and alleged torture—arose out of their service
to SGS. If they had not been working for SGS, they would not have
been detained and tortured along with the other SGS contractors.
Although they were providing evidence to the U.S. government, the
military was still justified in detaining them to determine if they were
“security threats” because of SGS’s illegal activities.
D. A Proposed Solution:
Learning to Stop Worrying and Love “Special Factors”
Judge Manion was correct in concluding that the courts should
wait until Congress acts to create a remedy for violations of
constitutional rights in a warzone. 173 This is because the American
way of waging war has changed, but there are no laws that fully
address this shift. Although Congress has passed laws that subject
civilians assisting the military in contingency operations to UCMJ
jurisdiction 174 , it has not fully regulated PMFs. To do so, it must
answer the “who,” “what,” “when,” “where,” “why,” and “how much”
of a private right of action for U.S. citizens who’s rights are violated.
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To the question of “who,” Congress will have to address several
different classes of individuals. The vast number 175 of contractors
working for PMFs alone will likely make this a herculean task. Within
this group, Congress will need to distinguish between the quasimilitary personnel and those who merely provide support or consulting
services. 176 In addition, there are those who merely report or provide
humanitarian assistance. Congress will need to distinguish between
these individuals and will have to weigh their rights against the
functions they perform and the likelihood that their rights will be
violated in a warzone. Congress will also need to address who can be
held liable and what level of immunity that person has.
In answering “what,” Congress will have to determine what
constitutes a violation of a citizen’s constitutional rights. As Judge
Manion pointed out, there is a vast difference between military
detention and imprisonment in domestic prisons. 177 All of the Bivens
precedent of Eighth Amendment violations has focused on domestic
prisons, 178 so Congress will need to set guidelines for what is and is
not appropriate treatment for U.S. citizens held in military detention in
a warzone. Again, careful attention must be paid to who is being held
in detention. Congress will also need to establish guidelines for other
constitutional rights because the Eighth Amendment is not the only
right that will likely be violated in a warzone.
The question of “when” will require a careful weighing of
interests because of the ever-changing nature of a warzone. If evidence
of a constitutional violation is to be preserved, claims must be allowed
to proceed relatively quickly. Although this may conflict with the
effective implementation of military policy and strategy, when a
violation is flagrant enough to state a claim, the victim of the violation
must be allowed to move quickly enough to preserve evidence so that
they can successfully raise their claim at a later date. The claim itself
must be heard later, however, as any evidence which forms a basis of
175
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the claim may reveal current national security or military strategies.
While the courts can use the state secrets privilege to protect sensitive
information, the best protection is time because if the strategies are no
longer relevant, their discovery will cause less harm to the military
effort.
The best answer for “where” is the federal judiciary because,
although the courts-martial are experienced with matters of military
policy, courts-martial do not have the same wealth of experience in
protecting constitutional rights. Bivens remedies have been litigated
for forty years in the federal judiciary, so federal judges are no
strangers to the contours of the doctrine. Congress should also
consider establishing a tribunal, which could be situated in or near the
warzone, to hear the preliminary aspects of a litigant’s claim and
determine whether it should proceed.
The question of “why” is easily answered because of the changing
way in which America wages war. There is a need to concretely define
the various aspects of claims for violations of constitutional rights in a
warzone, because once the courts have opened Pandora’s Box, they
will struggle to define the contours of the rights in a warzone and the
appropriate remedies. They will have to do so against the backdrop of
sensitive information, national security, military policy, and different
classes of plaintiffs, and likely will struggle until guidance is given by
the Supreme Court. Congress can bypass this process by enacting
legislations which clearly establishes the rights and remedies each
class is entitled to and accommodates the current realities of the
American way of waging war.
In answering “how much,” Congress will have to weigh how
prevalent these claims will become against the severity of the
violation. It will also have to account for the differences between
treatment in military detention centers and domestic prisons. Because
of the demands of war, military detention can be significantly harsher
than domestic prisons. Congress should therefore limit or adjust
damages because violations which would otherwise be serious in a
domestic prison could be commonplace in military detention in a
warzone. This would also allow the military to effectively implement
its policies without large damage awards acting as a hindrance.
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CONCLUSION
In its effort to establish a Bivens remedy because there “must be a
remedy” when allegations as serious as torture are raised, the Seventh
Circuit in Vance overstepped its bounds and answered a question best
left to Congress. 179 The reasoning employed by the majority
demonstrates how a focus on constitutional rights obscured the true
issue of whether the court should create a remedy. The dissent was
correct in concluding that courts are not the best forum to determine
whether a remedy should exist for violations of constitutional rights in
a warzone. Because matters of national security and military policy are
best left to Congress, especially in light of the unique status of quasimilitary personnel, it is the appropriate arbiter for creating a remedy.
Therefore, Congress must act to define the “who,” “what,” “when,”
“where,” “why,” and “how much” of a private right of action for U.S.
citizens who’s rights are violated in a warzone. Once Congress has
spoken on the issue, the federal judiciary will be able to fulfill its role
of safeguarding citizens’ rights.

179
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